Western betrayal is a concept, particularly popular among several Central European nations, (including Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia). It refers to the foreign policy of several Western countries, from the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 to the decades-long aftermath of World War II, the Cold War. Western betrayal refers to the perception that, during and after winning the World War II, the western Allies - despite glorifying democracy and self-determination in public statements, and despite having signed numerous international pacts and military alliances with the countries in question - nonetheless betrayed their Central European allies by not fulfilling the signed alliances and made promises, by doing nothing to prevent them from becoming communist puppet states of the Soviet Union. The concept is disputed by some, who argue that Churchill and Roosevelt had no other option but to accept any Stalin's demand in Teheran and later in Yalta.
Poland
First World War aftermath
After the First World War, Poland regained independence after 123 years of partitions. While the victorious Western allies supported the idea of independent Poland, their main reason for it was to weaken Germany and Russia. However their support was limited; for example, many French and British politicians considered that the industrial region of Silesia should remain with Germany, so that Germany would have an easier time paying of the war debts and contributions to France and its allies. Thus the Entente did not support Poland during the Silesian Uprisings.
During the Polish-Soviet War (1918-1921) there was a debate among western politicians which side they should support: the White Russians, representing the former Imperial Russia loyalists, the new Bolsheviks revolutionaries or newly independent countries trying to carve out their borders from the powers that lost the First World War. Eventually France and Britain decided to support White Russians and Poland; however, their support to Poland was limited to the few hundred soldiers of the French military mission. Western public opinion was strongly pro-Bolshevik, and when in early 1920 Poland looked likely to lose the war (which did not happen), Western diplomats encouraged Poland to surrender and settle for large territorial losses (the Curzon line).
In the late 1920s and early 1930s a complicated set of alliances was established amongst the nations of Europe, in the hope of preventing future wars (either with Germany or Soviet Russia). With the rise of Nazism in Germany this system of alliances was strengthened by the signing of a series of "mutual assistance" alliances between France, Britain, and Poland (Franco-Polish Alliance and Anglo-Polish Alliance ). This agreement stated that in the event of war the other allies were to fully mobilize and carry out a "ground intervention within two weeks" in support of the ally being attacked.
Up to 1939
Diplomacy
In the years following the end of World War I and the Polish-Soviet War, Poland had signed alliances with many European powers. The most important were the military alliance with France signed on February 19, 1921, and the defensive alliance with Romania of March 3, 1921. The alliance with France was a major factor in Polish inter-war foreign relations, and was seen as the main warrant of peace in Central Europe; Poland's military doctrine was heavily influenced by this alliance as well.
As World War II was nearing, both governments started to look for a renewal of the bilateral promises. This was accomplished in May 1939, when general Tadeusz Kasprzycki signed a secret protocol (later ratified by both governments) to the alliance with general Maurice Gamelin. It was agreed that France would grant her eastern ally a military credit as soon as possible. In case of war with Germany, France promised to start minor land and air military operations at once, and to start a major offensive (with the majority of its forces) not later than 15 days after the declaration of war.
On March 30, 1939, the government of the United Kingdom pledged to defend Poland, in the event of a German attack, and Romania in case of other threats. This declaration was further amended in April, when Poland's minister of foreign affairs Józef Beck met with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. In the aftermath of the talks a mutual assistance treaty was signed. On August 25 the Polish-British Common Defence Pact was signed as an annex to Polish-French alliance. It was clearly aimed against German aggression. In case of war United Kingdom was to start hostilities as soon as possible; initially helping Poland with air raids against the German war industry, and joining the struggle on land as soon as the British Expeditionary Corps arrives to France. In addition, a military credit was granted and armament was to reach Polish or Romanian ports in early autumn.
However, both British and French governments had other plans than fulfilling the treaties with Poland. On May 4, 1939, a meeting was held in Paris, at which it was decided that the fate of Poland depends on the final outcome of the war, which will depend on our ability to defeat Germany rather than to aid Poland at the beginning. Poland's government was not notified of this decision, and the Polish–British talks in London were continued. A full military alliance treaty was ready to be signed on August 22, but His Majesty's government postponed the signing until August 25, 1939.
At the same time secret German-Soviet talks were held in Moscow which resulted in signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on August 22. The full text of the treaty, including the secret protocol assuming a partition of Poland and Soviet military help to Germany in case of war, was known to the British government thanks to Hans von Herwarth, an American agent in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, Poland's government was not informed of this fact either.
The Phony War
After the war started on September 1, 1939, the Allied governments declared war on Germany on September 3. However, all other items of the March 30 guarantee pledge were violated; most notably the failure to respond to the September 17, 1939 Soviet invasion on Poland (the pledge would have dictated France and Great Britain to declare war on the Soviet Union much the same way they had on Germany). A French offensive in the Rhine river valley area (Saar Offensive ) started on September 7. Eleven French divisions (out of 96 being mobilized) advanced along a 32 km line near Saarbrücken with negligible German opposition. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily-mined German territory. At the same time Great Britain, who promised to start air-raids on German industry as soon as possible, prepared only one air attack against the German Kriegsmarine. After that, several actions took place in which British Wellingtons dropped propaganda leaflets on German cities. British losses during the air offensive against Germany were relatively light: seven bombers were lost in the air raid and two Spitfires were lost due to friendly fire. On September 11 the leaflet raids are halted.
On September 12, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately. By then the French divisions have advanced approximately eight kilometres into Germany on a 24 kilometres long strip of the frontier in the Saarland area. Maurice Gamelin ordered his troops to stop not closer than 1 kilometre from the German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions are in contact with the enemy, and that French advances have forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least 6 divisions from Poland. The following day the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland informed the Polish chief of staff, general Julian Stachiewicz , that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to September 20. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line. The Phony war started.
Although Poland held out for 5 weeks, three weeks longer than was planned, no direct and immediate military aid was ever given. The agreed upon "two week ground response" never materialized, and Poland fell to the Nazis as a result.
Aftermath
German propaganda poster, says in Polish: "England! Look what you've done!"
After the hostilities ended, German propaganda tried to win Poles and ensure collaboration by underlining that Poland was abandoned by her allies, and that the only world order that could ensure peaceful and prosperous life for the Poles was the German Reich. These claims were even strengthened by the French cease-fire signed in 1940 which was a clear violation of the alliance (both parties agreed not to sign any unilateral agreements with Germany).
Similar slogans were expressed by the Soviet Union propaganda until 1989. The official propaganda in all Eastern Bloc countries stated that Poland was betrayed and the only ally Poland can rely on is the Kremlin.
Dispute
The Allied attitude towards Poland in 1939 is a subject of an ongoing dispute among historians ever since. Some historians argue that if only France had pursued the offensive agreed on in the treaties, it would have definitely been able to break through the unfinished Siegfried Line and force Germany to fight a costly two-front war that it was in no position to win. At the same time, others argue that France and Britain had promised more than they could deliver (especially when confronted with the option to declare war on the Soviet Union for violating Poland's territory on September 17, 1939), and that the French army was superior to the Wehrmacht in numbers only. It lacked the offensive doctrines , mobilization schemes , and offensive spirit necessary to attack Germany.
The problem with Polish expectations is that they greatly exaggerate the capabilities of the Western Allies. Although France promptly declared war, the French mobilization was not complete until early October, by which time Poland had fallen. In Britain where mobilization was more rapid, only 1 in 40 men were mobilized (compared to 1 in 10 in France, and 1 in 20 in Poland), thus providing only a token force against Germany's forces of several million. The presumption that "something could have been done" but wasn't, overlooks the basic fact that the West, just like Poland, was ill equipped to fight the full force of Nazi Germany.
1940s
Atlantic Charter
Soon after the Third Reich had invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, the Polish government in exile signed a pact with Joseph Stalin. It declared all pacts the USSR had signed with the Nazis null and void, allowed the creation of the Polish Army in the East , and release all Polish citizens from the Soviet labor camps. Despite the difficulties the Soviet government made, many Poles were released from their confinement and could join the Polish Army formed formally on August 12, 1941. However, after the troops were withdrawn to the Middle East in March 1942, in June–July, 1942, Stalin revoked the amnesty and arrested all Polish diplomats in the USSR.
Meanwhile, on September 24, 1941, Poland and the USSR had signed the Atlantic Charter. It underlined that no territorial changes should be made that would not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. It was viewed by the Polish government as a warrant of Poland's borders, although it became apparent that some concessions would have to be made.
In December, 1941, a Conference was held in Moscow between the USSR and Great Britain. Stalin proposed to base post-war Polish western borders on the Oder-Neisse Line and demanded that the United Kingdom accept the pre-war western borders of the Soviet Union. Anthony Eden accepted the demand as he assumed that the border in question was the 1939 line. However, Stalin apparently meant the 1941 border with Germany. It was soon discovered, but British government decided not to change the document. On March 11, 1942 Winston Churchill notified prime minister Sikorski that the borders of the Baltic States and Romania were guaranteed, and that no decision was made regarding the borders of Poland.
Katyn and the Soviet pressure
The government of Poland from the very beginning of Polish-Soviet talks in 1941 was searching for approximately 20.000 Polish officers missing in Russia. Stalin always replied that they either must have fled to Mongolia or are somewhere in Russia, which is a big country and it's easy to get lost here. In April 1943 German news agencies reported of finding mass graves of Polish soldiers in Katyn. Polish government asked the government of the Soviet Union to examine the case and at the same time asked the International Red Cross for help in verifying the German reports.
On April 24, 1943, Sikorski met with Eden and demanded Allied help in releasing the Poles from GULag and Soviet prisons and declined the Soviet demand of withdrawal the plea for the Red Cross. Anthony Eden declined and on the following day the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Poland arguing that the Polish government was collaborating with Nazi Germany. Despite Polish pleas for help, USA and the United Kingdom decided not to put pressure on USSR.
After the Soviets stopped the German advance on the Eastern Front, Poland lost its significance as the main Eastern ally. After the German defeat at Stalingrad it became obvious. Between 12 and 19 of March 1943 Anthony Eden agreed with Franklin Delano Roosevelt upon the Curzon Line as the basis of the Polish Eastern border.
Tehran
In October 1943 the Big Three met at the Tehran Conference. Both Roosevelt and Churchill officially agreed that the eastern borders of Poland will roughly follow the Curzon Line. The Polish government was not notified of this decision and the only information given was the press release claiming that We await the day, when all nations of the world will live peacefully, free of tyranny, according to their national needs and conscience. The resulting loss of the "eastern territories," approximately 48% of Poland's pre-war territory, to the Soviet Union is seen by Poles as another "betrayal" by their Western Allies.
According to many historians, Churchill and Roosevelt promised Stalin to settle the issue with the Poles, however they never sincerely informed the Polish side. When the Polish Prime Minister visited Moscow, he was convinced he was coming to dicuss borders that were still disputed, while Stalin believed everything had already been settled. This was the principal reason for the failure of Polish Prime Minister's mission to Moscow.
Warsaw Uprising
- See: Lack of outside support in the Warsaw Uprising for more info on the Allied policy towards Poland during the Uprising.
Since the establishment of the Polish government in exile in Paris and then in London, the military commanders of the Polish army were focusing most of their efforts on preparation of a future all-national uprising against Germany. Finally the plans for Operation Tempest were prepared and on August 1, 1944 the Warsaw Uprising started. The Uprising was an armed struggle by the Polish Home Army to liberate Warsaw from German occupation and Nazi rule.
While from 4 August Polish and later RAF planes flew missions over Warsaw dropping supplies, the USAF planes did not join the operation. The Allies specific request for the use of Red Army airfields near Warsaw made on 20 August was denied by Stalin on 22 August (he referred to the insurgents as 'a handful of criminals'). After Stalin's objections to support for the uprising, Churchill telegrammed Roosevelt on 25 August and proposed sending planes in defiance of Stalin and to 'see what happens'. Roosevelt replied on 26 August that I do not consider it advantageous to the long-range general war prospect for me to join you in the proposed message to Uncle Joe ([1]).
Various scholars (including Norman Davies in his recently published Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw) argue that during the Warsaw Uprising both the governments of United Kingdom and the United States did little to help the Poland insurgents in their struggle. Also, it is often argued that the Allies put little pressure on Joseph Stalin to help the Polish struggle.
Yalta
- See also: Yalta conference.
In 1945, Poland's borders were redrawn, following the decision taken at the Tehran Conference of 1943 at the insistence of the Soviet Union. Polish government was not invited to the talks and was to be notified of their outcome. The eastern territories which the Soviet Union had occupied in 1939 (with the exception of the Bialystok area) were permanently annexed, and most of their Polish inhabitants expelled: today these territories are part of Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. The factual basis of this decision was the result of a forged referendum from November 1939 in which the "huge majority" of voters accepted the incorporation of these lands into Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. In compensation, Poland was given former German territory (the so-called Regained Territories): the southern half of East Prussia and all of Pomerania and Silesia, up to the Oder-Neisse Line. These territories were repopulated with Poles expelled from the eastern regions. Polish resistance fighters were incarcerated or deported to GULags in Siberia by Stalin, in line with decisions made by Churchill and Roosevelt.
The fact that Western leaders tried to force Polish leaders to accept the conditions of Stalin is a matter of continuing resentment for some Poles even today. Some view it as a 'betrayal' of Poland by its Western allies (which can be seen as part of a larger 'betrayal' to allow it to fall entirely into the Soviet sphere of influence). Moreover, it was used by ruling communists to underline anti-Western sentiments. It was easy to argue that Poland was not too important to the West, since its leaders sacrificed Polish borders, legal government and free elections. On this background even Stalin looked as a better friend of Poland, since he had strong interests in Poland. Defenders of the actions taken by the Western allies maintain that Realpolitik made it impossible to do anything else, and that they were in no shape to start a war with the Soviet Union over the subjugation of Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries immediately after the end of World War II. Some argue that the actions of the Secretary of State were a result of ignorance rather than Realpolitik.
What the Western allies sacrificed is also disputed. Some argue that Poland's borders had been re-drawn many times in history, the country had not had free elections since 1926 and throughout the 1930s it had endured increasing political repression under an authoritarian Sanacja government. On the other hand, the Polish government in exile was composed entirely of the pre-war democratic opposition and all political parties of the Polish Secret State underlined the need to follow the democratic traditions of March 1921 constitution, rather than autocratic April constitution of Poland of 1935.
Aftermath
Władysław Sikorski, Prime Minister of Polish Government in Exile, was killed in an air crash over Gibraltar in July 1943. As he was the most prestigious leader of the Polish exiles, his death was a severe setback to the Polish cause, and was certainly highly convenient for Stalin. It was in some ways also convenient for the western Allies, who were finding the Polish issue a stumbling-block in their efforts to preserve good relations with Stalin.
This has given rise to persistent suggestions that Sikorski's death was not accidental. Many historians speculate that his death might have been effect of Soviet, British or even Polish conspiracy. This has never been proved, and the fact that the principal exponents of this theory in the west have been the revisionist historians David Irving and Rolf Hochhuth has not encouraged many western historians to take it seriously.
On the other hand by 2000 only a small part of the British Intelligence documents related to Sikorski's death had been unclassified and made available to Polish historians. The majority of the files will be classified for another "50 to 100 years."
In November 1944, despite his mistrust of the Soviets, Sikorski's successor, Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk resigned to return to Poland and take office in the new government established under the auspices of the Soviet occupation authorities. Many of the Polish exiles opposed this action, believing that this government was a facade for the establishment of Communist rule in Poland, a view that was later proved correct; after losing an election which was later shown to have been fraudulent, Mikolajczyk left Poland again in 1947.
Meanwhile the government in exile had maintained its existence, but the United States and the United Kingdom withdrew their recognition on July 6, 1945. The Polish armed forces in exile were disbanded in 1945 and most of their members, unable to return to Communist Poland, settled in other countries. The London Poles had to leave the embassy on Portland Place and were left only with the president's private residence at 43 Eaton Place. The government in exile then became largely symbolic, serving mainly to symbolise the continued resistance to foreign occupation of Poland, and retaining control of some important archives from pre-war Poland. Ireland and Spain were the last countries to recognize the government in exile.
No representatives of Polish military, 4th largest in the Second World War, veterans of Battle of Britain and Monte Cassino, were invited to the London Victory Parade of 1946 - Poles were supposed to attend the Moscow Victory Parade instead.
At war's end many of these feelings of resentment were capitalized on by the occupying Soviets, who used them to reinforce anti-Western sentiments within Poland. Propaganda was produced by Communists to show Russia as the Great Liberator, and the West as the Great Traitor. Capitalism was shown as being inherently bad, because capitalists only cared for "their own skin," while communism was portrayed as the great "uniter and protector."
Dispute
Soviet actions made it clear that nothing short of another war would force them out of Poland. Records of the time show that considerable diplomatic pressure was brought to bear on the Soviet Union by both Britain and the United States to persuade her to permit democratic elections in Poland, and in fact the Soviet Union promised exactly that. It seems however that somewhere along the way Stalin changed his mind .
Czechoslovakia
See also: History of Czechoslovakia#Before WWII (1938 – 1939) and later sections
Unlike many of its neighbours, Czechoslovakia formed a stable republic after World War I and remained the only truly democratic state in Central Europe. However, territorial disputes with Germany, Poland and Hungary made the international situation of the state critical in the late thirties.
The League of Nations was seen as the main guarantor of peace. To protect against possible threats, Czechoslovakia signed numerous international treaties including military alliances with France and the United Kingdom. Additional pacts were signed with the Soviet Union.
Munich Conference
However when the German nationalist minority, led by Konrad Henlein and vehemently backed by Hitler, demanded the cession of the Sudetenland, Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian borderlands, the German territorial claims were met with no opposition from Czechoslovak allies. In September of 1938 France and the UK decided to compromise the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia at the Munich Conference. On September 29, the Munich Agreement was signed by Germany, Italy, France, and Britain. The Munich Agreement stipulated that Czechoslovakia must cede Sudeten territory to Germany. The government of Czechoslovakia was not invited to the meeting.
The term Munich betrayal (Mnichovska zrada in Czech) is frequently used to denote the Munich Agreement.
In early November 1938, under the Vienna Award, which was a result of the Munich agreement, Czechoslovakia (and later Slovakia) was forced by Germany and Italy to cede southern Slovakia (1/3 of Slovak territory) to Hungary, and Poland obtained small territorial cessions shortly thereafter. In late November 1938, the truncated state, renamed Czecho-Slovakia [the so-called Second Republic], was reconstituted in three autonomous units - Czechia (i.e. Bohemia and Moravia), Slovakia, and Ruthenia. On 14 March 1939, Slovakia gained nominal independence as a satellite state under Jozef Tiso. One day later, Hitler forced the president of Czecho-Slovakia, Emil Hácha, to surrender remaining Czechia to German control and made it into the German protectorate "Bohemia and Moravia". On the same day (March 15), the Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian Ruthenia) declared its independence and was immediately invaded and annexed by Hungary. Finally, on March 23 Hungary invaded and occupied from the Carpatho-Ukraine some further parts of Slovakia (eastern Slovakia).
Second World War Ally
During the Second World War, former president Edvard Benes and other Czechoslovak exiles in London organized a Czechoslovak government-in-exile and negotiated to obtain international recognition for the government and a renunciation of the Munich Agreement and its consequences. In the summer of 1941, the Allies recognized the exiled government. Czechoslovak military units fought alongside the Allied forces.
On 8th May 1944, Benes signed an agreement with Soviet leaders stipulating that Czechoslovak territory liberated by Soviet armies would be placed under Czechoslovak civilian control.
The so-called Third Republic came into being in April 1945 and at first included representatives from the Benes government-in exile. The Soviet-backed communist parties grew in power and in 1947 the communist-controlled Ministry of Interior deployed police regiments to sensitive areas and equipped a workers' militia. On 25 February, Benes, perhaps fearing Soviet intervention, capitulated. He accepted the resignations of the dissident ministers and received a new cabinet list, thus completing the communist takeover. In February 1948, when the Communists definitively took power, Czechoslovakia was declared a "people's democracy".
Neither France nor United Kingdom intervened on the part of the Benes or other democratic representatives.
Finland
Ukraine
Yugoslavia
At the Tehran Conference in November 1943, a decision was made by the Allies to cease their support of the Royalist Chetniks, and switch allegiances to Josip Broz Tito's communist Yugoslav National Liberation Army.
While the West (primarily the UK) had supported the Yugoslav monarchy (allowing the exiled King to settle in London and providing assistance to the Chetniks via RAF and SOE) prior to 1943, the people of Yugoslavia had by and large already abandoned it, given how the kingdom deteriorated after the death of King Aleksandar and especially how it crumbled in the March and April of 1941 when the Axis Powers invaded it. Therefore it would be difficult to speak of a Western betrayal of Yugoslavia in the context of 1940s and later decades.
After the breakup of the second Yugoslavia, Chetnik supporters in Serbia were no longer banned from public speaking and they could voice their opposite—if minority—opinion. With the rise in popularity of the Serbian Radical Party, opinions of a Western betrayal may have entered the Serbian mainstream public opinion, although they still remain in minority.
The public opinion in other former Yugoslav republics (at least Slovenia, Croatia and most of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was also somewhat altered after the fall of Yugoslavia, but it mostly remains unchanged on the fairly negative stance towards the pre-war Yugoslav kingdom.
References
Books
- Andrzej Ajnenkiel , Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy. Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warsaw, 2000.
- Nicholas Bethell , The War Hitler Won: The Fall of Poland, September 1939, New York, 1972.
- Jan Ciałowicz , Polsko-francuski sojusz wojskowy, 1921-1939; PWN , Warsaw, 1971.
- Norman Davies, Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw. Viking Books, 2004. ISBN 0670032840.
- Norman Davies, God's Playground ISBN 0231053533 and ISBN 0231053517 (two tomes).
- Arthur Bliss Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1948. ISBN 1125475501.
- David Martin, Ally Betrayed. Prentice-Hall, New York, 1946.
- David Martin, Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailovich. Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1978. ISBN 081796911X.
- David Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, San Diego & New York, 1990. ISBN 015180743.
- Lynne Olson , Stanley Cloud , A Question of Honor : The Kosciuszko Squadron: Forgotten Heroes of World War II. Knopf, 2003. ISBN 0375411976.
- Anita Prażmowska , Poland: the Betrayed Ally. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995. ISBN 0521483859.
- Count Edward Raczyński, The British-Polish Alliance; Its Origin and Meaning. The Mellville Press, London, 1948.
- Edward Rozek , Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland, New York, 1958, reprint Boulder, CO, 1989.
- Republic of Poland, The Polish White Book: Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations 1933-1939; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, New York, 1940.
Essays and articles
- Daniel Johnson, Betrayed by the Big Three. Daily Telegraph, London, November 8, 2003
- Diana Kuprel , How the Allies Betrayed Warsaw. Globe and Mail, Toronto, February 7, 2004
- Ari Shaltiel , The Great Betrayal. Haaretz, Tel Aviv, February 23, 2004
Dictionaries
See also
External links
